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I. INTRODUCTION
Environmental law has emerged as a distinct field of legal expertise over the past twenty
years.1 In the mid-1960's, Congress and state legislatures responded to toxic tort litiga-
tion2 and public demand for improved environmental quality by adopting numerous state
3
* Richard T. Bennett is a partner in the law firm of Bennett, Lotterhos, Sulser& Wilson, Jackson, Mississippi. The author appre-
ciates the research assistance of Mary E. McAlister and R. Keith Foreman, both of whom are associates in the firm of Bennett,
Lotterhos, Sulser & Wilson, in preparation of this article.
1. Congress began comprehensive federal regulation of environmental matters in the late 1960s. The National Environmen-
tal Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (1988), enacted in 1969, articulated a federal policy to "create and maintain conditions under
which man and nature can exist in productive harmony." 42 U.S.C. § 4331 (a) (1988). The Act also created the Council on Envi-
ronmental Quality (CEQ) to advise the President on environmental matters. By executive order, President Nixon created the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to centralize federal environmental regulation.
2. The term "toxic tort" is a relatively recent designation used with respect to litigation arising out of a wide variety of factual
situations. Such situations may include product sales, waste disposal, property ownership, and industrial activities. While a
comprehensive list of toxic tort characteristics cannot be stated, such claims often involve public exposure to a harmful substance,
serious physical injury, property damage claims, and long latency periods before the manifestation of injury. See, e.g., M. DORE,
LAw OF Toxic ToRrs § 2.01 (1989).
3. See, e.g., Solid Wastes Disposal Law, Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 17-17-1 to -135 (Supp. 1989); Mississippi Radiation Protec-
tion Law of 1976, Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 45-14-1 to -69 (1972 & Supp. 1989): Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 49-2-1 to -25 (Supp. 1989)
(creating the Department of Environmental Quality); Mississippi Air and Water Pollution Control Law, MIss. CODE ANN. §§ 49-
17-1 to -43 (1972 & Supp. 1989); Mississippi Underground Storage Tank Act of 1988, Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 49-17-401 to -433
(Supp. 1989); Mississippi Development, Production and Distribution of Gas and Oil Law, Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 53-3-1 to -203
(1972 & Supp. 1989); Mississippi Surface Mining and Reclamation Law, Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 53-7-1 to -75 (Supp. 1989); Mis-
sissippi Surface Coal Mining and Reclamation Law, Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 53-9-1 to -91 (Supp. 1989). Violation of numerous
other state statutes, regulations, and municipal ordinances also may result in environmental liability.
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and federal4 environmental laws and regulations. These measures are intended to control
hazardous waste generation, transportation, and disposal activities; facilitate remedial
actions; regulate the nation's resources; and impose liability for hazardous waste-related
conduct. The imposition of liability for improper disposal of hazardous waste has clearly
been the greatest development in the last decade. In view of this nation's environmental
concerns, it can be anticipated that the courts will focus on such liability in the future.
Both courts and legislatures have expanded liability for damages caused by hazardous
substances beyond traditional common law liability5 and seek to impose liability for toxic
torts, cleanup costs, and violations of federal, state, and local environmental laws, per-
mits, and ordinances. Varying standards of liability range from negligence to strict liabil-
ity.6 The magnitude of environmental and toxic tort liability has materially and adversely
affected the financial condition of environmental defendants. Predictably, many defend-
ants have sought relief from environmental liability in bankruptcy court.
This article addresses environmental concerns arising in bankruptcy litigation involv-
ing relief from the automatic stay,' priority of claims,8 abandonment of property,9 and dis-
chargeability of claims.'0 In approaching these subjects, the practitioner should be keenly
aware that developments in this area are recent and rapid and that the cases and materials
4. See, e.g., The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA or Super-
fund), and The Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 (SARA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1989); The Fed-
eral Water Pollution Control Act (Clean Water Act), as amended, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1989); The Clean Air Act, 42
U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (1989); The Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. § 300f-300j-26 (1989); The Toxic Substances Control
Act (TSCA), 15 U.S.C. §§2601-2671 (1989); The Resources Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), as amended, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 6901-6992 (1989); Solid Waste 40 C. F. R. §§ 240-257 (1989); Hazardous Waste Management System, 40 C. F.R. §§ 260-267
(1989); Underground Storage Tanks, 40 C.F.R. § 280 (1988); The Marine Protection Research and Sanctuary Act (Ocean
Dumping Act), 33 U.S.C. §§ 1401-1445 (1989); The Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA), 7 U.S.C. §
1
36 -136y (1989); The Hazardous Materials Transportation Act, 49 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1813 (1989); The Food, Drug and Cos-
metic Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-393 (1989); The Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (1989); The Occupational
Safety and Health Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1989); The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. §§
4321-4375 (1989); The Consumer Product Safety Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2051-2083 (1989); The Noise Control Act, 42 U.S.C. §§
4901-4918 (1989); The Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act, 30 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1328 (1989); The Energy Policy and
Conservation Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6201-6422 (1989); The Powerplant and Industrial Fuel Use Act of 1978, 49 U.S.C. app. § 26
(1988); The National Historic Preservation Act, 16 U.S.C. § 470-470w-6 (1988); The Coastal Zone Management Act, 16
U.S.C. §§ 1451-1464 (1989); The Deep Water Port Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1501-1524 (1989); The Intervention on High Seas Act,
33 U.S.C. §§ 1471-1487 (1989); The Atomic Energy Act of 1954, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011-2296 (1989); The Outer Continental
Shelf Land Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1356 (1989); The Uranium Mill Tailings Radiation Control Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7901-7942
(1989); The Refuse Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 407-467n (1989); and the federal regulations promulgated under these statutes. Numer-
ous other more specialized laws may apply to particular environmental activities, and federal securities laws may impose special
environmental disclosure requirements in connection with filing registration statements, annual reports, or other documents with
the Securities and Exchange Commission.
5. The principal common law theories of liability include: negligence, e.g., Knabe v. National Supply Div. of Armco Steel
Corp., 529 F2d 841 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 856 (1976); trespass, e.g., City of Philadelphia v. Stepan Chem. Co., 544
F. Supp. 1135 (E.D. Pa. 1982); nuisance, e.g., State of New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032 (2d Cir. 1985); Village
of Wilsonville v. SCA Serv., 77 111. App. 3d 618, 396 N.E.2d 552 (1979), affd, 82 111. 2d 1, 426 N.E.2d 824 (1981); and strict
liability, e.g., Branch v. Western Petroleum, Inc., 657 P.2d 267 (Utah 1982).
6. See, e.g., United States v. Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160 (4th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 3 156 (1989); New York
v. Shore Realty Co., 759 F.2d 1032 (2d Cir. 1985); United States v. M/V Big Sam, 681 F.2d 432 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied,
462 U.S. 1132 (1983); United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co., 579 F. Supp. 823 (W.D. Mo. 1984), affd in
part, 810 F.2d 726 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 848 (1987); Kenney v. Scientific, Inc., 204 N.J. Super. 228,497 A.2d
1310 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1985); State v. Ventron, 94 N.J. 473, 468 A.2d 150 (1983); DiBenedetto, Generator Liability
Under the Common La and Federal and State Statutes, 39 Bus. LAW. 661 (1984).
7. 11 U.S.C. §362(1988).
8. 11 U.S.C. § 507 (1988).
9. 11 U.S.C. § 554 (1988).
10. 11 U.S.C. §727(1988).
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cited must be updated to ensure that subsequent judicial or scientific advances have not
altered the significance of these authorities."
II. CERCLA
The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act of
1980 (CERCLA)12 is one of the primary sources of environmental liability. This statute
provides a wide variety of remedial, administrative, liability, and tax provisions13 and di-
rects the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to clean up hazardous waste sites and to
impose the costs of those remedial actions14 upon a broad range of parties" associated with
the site from which the wastes were removed. In 1986, Congress amended the statute to
strengthen cleanup standards, to extend coverage of the Act to both private and government
waste disposal sites, and to add "right-to-know" provisions that require disclosure of an-
nual emissions of specified chemical substances and notification of state and local govern-
ments immediately after an emergency release of certain chemicals or hazardous
substances.16
CERCLA authorizes the EPA to clean up any site where a release or threatened release
of a hazardous substance17 could present an imminent and substantial danger to the public
health or welfare.' 8 The government is also authorized to engage in permanent cleanup
II. Numerous issues are beyond the scope of this article. Consider, for example, whether a trustee may sell property free and
clear of a Superfund lien; whether a trustee may object to a secured creditor's proof of a claim on the basis that the collateral is
subject to an environmental claim; whether a trustee, when dealing with contaminated property, may reject or accept executory
contracts or unexpired leases pertaining to the property; and the circumstances under which a trustee may institute turn-over
proceedings as to contaminated property.
12. See supra note 4.
13. See Grad, A Legislative History of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability ('Superfund")
Act of1980, 8 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1 (1982); Dore, The Standard of Civil Liability for Hazardous Waste Disposal Activity: Some
Quirks of Superfund, 57 NoTItE DAME L. REv. 260 (1981).
14.42 U.S.C. §9607 (1988).
15. Liability for cleanup or response costs may be imposed on current and former owners and operators of facilities where
hazardous substances have come to rest, as well as generators and transporters of waste to the site. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(l)-(4)
(1988); persons who generated the substances and arranged for their disposal, id.; e.g., United States v. Bliss, 667 F. Supp. 1298
(E.D. Mo. 1987); persons who owned or operated the facilities at the time the substances were deposited, 42 U.S.C. §
9607(a)(2) (1988); e.g., United States v. Stringfellow, 755 F.2d 1383 (9th Cir.), cert. dismissed sub nom. Stringfellow v. Con-
cerned Neighbors in Action, 471 U.S. 1095 (1985); tenants and owners of personal and real property and those who run the
facility; e.g., Artisan Water Co. v. New Castle County, 659 F. Supp. 1269 (D. Del. 1987), affd, 851 F.2d 643 (3d Cir. 1988);
individuals who are or were responsible for managing the facility or the hazardous substances; see, e.g., Missouri v. Syntex, Inc.,
17 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 21013 (E.D. Mo. 1987); business entities such as lenders, real estate developers, and lessors
even though they did not cause or aggravate the environmental problem; see, e.g., United States v. Mirabile, 15 Envtl. L. Rep.
(Envtl. L. Inst.) 20994 (E.D. Pa. 1985); United States v. Maryland Bank & Trust Co.. 632 F Supp. 573 (D. Md. 1986); Tangle-
wood E. Homeowners v. Charles-Thomas, Inc., 849 F.2d 1568 (5th Cit. 1988); shareholders, In re Acushnet River & New Be-
dford Harbor Proceedings Re Alleged PCB Pollution, 675 F. Supp. 22 (D. Mass. 1987), United States v. Stringfellow, 20 E.R.C.
1905 (C.D. Cal. 1984); corporate officials and employees, United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co., 579 F.
Supp. 823 (W.D. Mo. 1984), affd in par, 810 F.2d 726 (8th Cir. 1986), cer. denied, 484 U.S. 848 (1987): United States v.
Wade, 577 F. Supp. 1326 (E.D. Pa. 1983).
16.42 U.S.C. § 11001 (1988).
17. Hazardous substances are defined by reference to substances identified under other federal environmental statutes. 42
U.S.C. § 9601(14) (1988); see, e.g., United States v. Wade, 577 F. Supp. 1326 (E.D. Pa. 1983); see40 C.F.R. § 302.4 (1989).
18.42 U.S.C. §9604 (1988).
1989]
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efforts at sites considered sufficiently hazardous' 9 tojustify their inclusion on the National
Priorities List of hazardous waste sites.20
In interpreting the liability provisions of CERCLA in government cost reimbursement
actions, courts have imposed liability 21 upon "responsible parties" even though the conduct
of the defendant would not have given rise to liability at the time in which the conduct was
engaged,22 the conduct was not negligent or otherwise wrongful,23 and the waste generated
by the defendant was not the sole cause 24 or, indeed, even a partial cause21 of the environ-
mental problems at the site. The government may order the responsible party to clean up
the facility, or the government may perform the cleanup and recover "response costs. "26 A
state or private party27 also may clean up a hazardous waste site and then seek reimburse-
ment from the Superfund.28
III. BANKRUPTCY LITIGATION
A. The Automatic Stay
The order for relief in the voluntary petition and the mere filing of the involuntary peti-
tion invoke the automatic stay provisions of the Bankruptcy Code.2 9 The stay applies to all
19. CERCLA establishes the National Contingency Plan (NCP) as the basic policy directive for federal response actions. It
sets forth the Hazard Ranking System, as well as procedures and standards for responding to releases of hazardous substances.
The NCP is subject to regular revision. 42 U.S.C. § 9605 (1988); see 40 C.F.R. § 300 (1989).
20. The National Priorities List (NPL) is a list of sites across the country selected by application of the Hazard Ranking Sys-
tem and slated for EPA enforcement action or cleanup. 42 U.S.C. § 9605 (1988). The NPL is periodically revised.
2 1. Strict liability and joint and several liability apply under CERCLA with no need to show actual physical harm, fault, ille-
gal activity, or even knowledge that the substances were hazardous before cleanup may be required. See, e.g., United States v.
Northernaire Plating Co., 670 F. Supp. 742 (W.D. Mich. 1987), affd, 889 F.2d 1497 (6th Cir. 1989), cer. denied, 110 S. Ct.
1527 (1990); United States v. Bliss, 667 F. Supp. 1298 (E.D. Mo. 1987); Jersey City Redevelopment Auth. v. PPG Indus., 655
F. Supp. 1257 (D.N.J. 1987). Narrow defenses to a cost recovery action are provided. Liability may be avoided when the dam-
ages result solely from an act of God; an act of war; an act or omission of a third party who is not an employee or agent of the
defendant or with whom the defendant has a direct or indirect contractual relationship, and the defendant exercised due care and
took precautions against the third party's foreseeable acts or omissions and the foreseeable consequences; an act or omission of a
third party who is not an employee or agent of the defendant, or with whom the defendant has a direct or indirect contractual
relationship unless the defendant did not know and had no reason to know that hazardous substances were present prior to the
defendant's acquisition of the property, or any combination of the foregoing. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601, 9607 (1988).
Recently, the Eleventh Circuit in United States v. Fleet Factors Corp., 901 F.2d 1550 (1 lth Cir. 1990), held that a secured
creditor may be liable under CERCLA if it participates in the management of a faciity at a time when hazardous wastes are
deposited on the debtor's premises. It is not necessary, in the view of the Eleventh Circuit, for a secured creditor to be involved in
day-to-day operations of a facility to become liable. This decision raises important and not easily answered questions for all
parties-in-interest under the Bankruptcy Code.
22. Caldwell v. Gurley Ref. Co., 755 F.2d 645 (8th Cir. 1985); Ohio er rel. Brown v. Georgeoff, 562 F Supp. 1300 (N.D.
Ohio 1983).
23. United States v. Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802 (S.D. Ohio 1983).
24. United States v. Wade, 546 F. Supp. 785 (E.D. Pa. 1982), affd, 713 F.2d 49 (3d Cir. 1983).
25. New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032 (2d Cir. 1985).
26.42 U.S.C. §§ 9606(a), 9607(a) (1988). Response costs include environmental studies, cleanup costs, and damages for
injury to or destruction of natural resources. See 42 U.S.C. § 9601(23)-(25) (1988); see also, e.g., Artisan Water Co. v. New
Castle County, 659 F. Supp. 1269 (D. Del. 1987), affd, 851 F.2d 643 (3d Cir. 1988); Mitchell v. Georgia Gulf Corp., No. 87-
151-A (M.D. La. filed July 22, 1987).
27.42 U.S.C. §§ 9604(a), 9606(a), 9607(a) (1988); see, e.g., Sand Springs Homes v. Interplastic Corp., 670 F. Supp. 913
(N.D. Okla. 1987).
28. 42 U.S.C. § 9611 (1988) establishes the Hazardous Substances Trust Fund-the Superfund- to finance cleanup of haz-
ardous waste sites.
29. I1 U.S.C. § 362(a) (1988). The order for relief automatically creates a bankruptcy estate. An estate is comprised of
essentially all property of the debtor as of the date of the petition. IIU.S.C. § 541(a) (1988).
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3 31entities,30 and with few exceptions, prohibits any actions which may directly or indi-
rectly interfere with the administration of the estate.32 Filing of a bankruptcy petition does
not operate as a stay regarding the commencement or continuation of an action or proceed-
ing by a governmental unit to enforce its police or regulatory power, or of the enforcement
of ajudgment, other than a moneyjudgment, obtained in an action or proceeding by a gov-
ernmental unit to enforce its police or regulatory power.
33
The courts will not automatically assume that all actions by a governmental unit are in
the exercise of its police powers. 34 Whether a governmental unit is exercising its police or
regulatory powers is a frequent issue which arises in the area of suits pending against
debtors seeking redress for violations of environmental laws.3" Six circuit court decisions
have considered the scope of this exemption to the automatic stay: Penn Terra, Ltd. v. De-
partment of Environmental Resources,36 United States v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. ,7
Commonwealth Oil Refining Co. v. United States Environmental Protection Agency (In re
Commonwealth Oil Refining Co.),38 United States v. Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp. ,39
Word v. Commerce Oil Co. (In re Commerce Oil Co.), 40 and United States v. Nicolet, Inc. 41
Penn Terra involved a Pennsylvania coal surface mining company which had violated
several environmental protection statutes. 42  Through its Department of Environmental
30. In re Miller Dev. Corp. of La., 71 Bankr. 460 (Bankr. M.D. La. 1987).
31. 11 U.S.C. § 362(b) (1988).
32. 11 U.S.C. §§ 301-366 (1988).
33. 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(4)-(5) (1988). 11 U.S.C. § 101(26) defines "governmental unit" as:
[The] United States; State; Commonwealth; District; Territory; municipality; foreign state; department, agency, or in-
strumentality of the United States (but not a United States trustee while serving as a trustee in a case under this title), a
State, a Commonwealth, a District, a Territory, a municipality, or a foreign state; or other foreign or domestic govern-
ment.
Id.
34. Tabb, Competing Policies in Bankruptcy: The Governmental Exception to theAutomatic Stay, 21 TULSA L.J. 183 (1985). In
United States v. Ilco, Inc. (In re Ilco, Inc.), 48 Bankr. 1016 (N.D. Ala. 1985), the court held that the automatic stay was inappli-
cable to a complaint filed by the United States seeking prohibitory injunctive relief against the debtor in connection with alleged
violations by the debtor of federal environmental statutes where the complaint sought equitable relief of preventing future environ-
mental harm rather than the enforcement of a money judgment, as provided by 11 U.S.C.A. §§ 362(a), (b)(4)-(5) (West 1979).
35. Penn Terra, Ltd. v. Pennsylvania Dep't of Envtl. Resources, 733 F.2d. 267 (3d Cir. 1984); Illinois v. Electrical Utils., 41
Bankr. 874 (N.D. I11. 1984). Private corporations pursuing citizen action against a debtor under the Clean Water Act were not
'governmental units" within the meaning of Bankruptcy Code section providing that the filing of a bankruptcy petition does not
operate as a stay of the commencement or continuation of an action of a proceeding by a governmental unit to enforce its police or
regulatory power, notwithstanding that they may have been in the position of private attorneys general seeking to enforce environ-
mental laws. Hudson River Sloop Clearwater, Inc. v. Revere Copper Prods., Inc. (In re Revere Copper & Brass, Inc.), 32 Bankr.
725 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
On the other hand, in Illinois v. Electrical Utils., 41 Bankr. 874 (N.D. I11. 1984), in which the State of Illinois brought an action
against the debtor, its president, and trustee bank alleging violations under the Toxic Substances Control Act by dumping chemi-
cals on the debtor's manufacturing site, such action fell within the exception to the automatic stay provisions of § 362(b)(4).
Section 362(b)(4) does not operate as a stay of a suit by a governmental unit to enforce such governmental unit's police and regula-
tory power. Accordingly, when states attempt to protect their citizens from environmental hazards, the action or proceeding is not
stayed under the automatic stay. Utah Div. of Oil, Gas & Mining v. Kaiser Steel Corp. (In re Kaiser Steel Corp.), 87 Bankr. 662
(Bankr. D. Colo. 1988); Brock v. Morysville Body Works, Inc., 829 F.2d 383 (3d Cir. 1987); Cournoyer v. Town of Lincoln, 790
F.2d 971 (lst Cir. 1986).
36. 733 F.2d 267 (3d Cir. 1984).
37. 804 F.2d 348 (6th Cir. 1986).
38. 805 F.2d 1175 (5th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1005 (1987).
39. 818 F.2d 1077 (3d Cir. 1987).
40. 847 F.2d 291 (6th Cir. 1988).
41. 857 F.2d 202 (3d Cir. 1988).
42. 733 F2d at 269.
1989]
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Resources, the State of Pennsylvania sought an injunction to require the company to cor-
rect the violations. The debtor argued that the injunction would violate the automatic
stay.43 After framing the issue as to whether an injunction ordering the debtor to perform
the reclamation work amounted to an attempt to enforce a money judgment," the Third
Circuit concluded that the suit was properly brought as an equitable action to prevent fu-
ture harm and did not constitute an action to enforce a money judgment.4
5 The rationale
employed by the court was that the exception of 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(4)-(5) to the auto-
matic stay should be construed broadly and that no unnatural effort should be made to limit
its goal.46 Conversely, the "exception to the exception" created by 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(5),
rendering "enforcement of a money judgment" by a governmental unit subject to the auto-
matic stay, "should be construed narrowly so as to leave to the States as much of their po-
lice power as a fair reading of the statute allows. 47
Recognizing that some actions by a governmental unit may not facially appear to be an
enforcement of a money judgment, the court noted that it is necessary to look beyond the
form of actions and determine whether the entity is attempting to achieve in actuality what
a moneyjudgment was intended to accomplish.' Inquiry should be made as to the injuries
which the challenged remedy is intended to redress-"including whether plaintiff seeks
compensation for past damages or prevention of future harm- in order to reach the ulti-
mate conclusion as to whether these injuries are traditionally rectified by a money judg-
ment and its enforcement.""
The Sixth Circuit, in United States v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 5 acknowledged that
the purpose of the automatic stay "is to ensure that the assets of a debtor are not reduced or
disturbed and to protect the bankruptcy court's exclusive jurisdiction over the debtor and
his property. ' Following a review of the legislative history of 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(4), 2
the court determined that the government's action in the case was an attempt to fix dam-
ages for a violation of the Clean Air Act.5 3 Significant to the court's determination was that
the resolution of the issue would neither affect its other creditors54 nor increase or decrease
the debtor's assets.
In Commonwealth Oil Refining Co. v. United States Environmental Protection Agency (In
re Commonwealth Oil Refining Co.),%5 the EPA brought administrative actions to require
the debtor's hazardous waste facility to comply with federal and state environmental
43. id. at 270.
44. ld. at 272.
45. Id. at 278.
46. Id. at 273.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 278.
49. Id.
50. 804 F2d 348 (6th Cir. 1986).
51. Id. at 350 (citing Atlantic Richfield Co. v. Good Hope Refineries, Inc., 604 F.2d 865, 868-69 (5th Cir. 1979)).
52. The legislative history of II U.S.C. § 362(b)(4) states that "[wihere a governmental unit is suing a debtor to prevent or
stop violation of fraud, environmental protection, consumer protection, safety, or similar police or regulatory laws, or attempting
toffix damnages for violation of such a law, the action or proceeding is not stayed under the automatic stay." H.R. REP. No. 598,
95th Cong., 1st Sess. 343, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CoOE CONG. & ADsHN. NEws 5963, 6299 (emphasis added).
53.42 U.S.C. § 7401 (1989).
54. 804 F 2d at 351.
55. 805 F.2d 1175 (5th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1005 (1987).
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laws. 6 The debtor then moved for an order determining the applicability of the automatic
stay provision to the impending enforcement action by the EPA and, alternatively, moved
for an order staying the EPA's enforcement action under the equity powers of the Bank-
ruptcy Code.57 After reviewing pertinent legislative history, 8 the Fifth Circuit deter-
mined that the EPA's enforcement action was a proper exercise of its regulatory power and
was not an attempt to enforce a money judgment. Similarly, the Third Circuit in United
States v. Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp. 59 held that a decree requiring the debtor corpora-
tion to install pollution control equipment was not a violation of the automatic stay.
60
Whether proceedings by the State of Tennessee to fix civil fines and penalties under the
Tennessee Water Quality Control Act of 197761 were subject to the provisions of the auto-
matic stay was addressed by the Sixth Circuit in Word v. Commerce Oil Co. (In re Com-
merce Oil Co.). 62 Examining the Tennessee Water Quality Control Act, the court found
that the proprietary or pecuniary reward in assessing penalties under the Act was appar-
ently of only secondary importance to the state and concluded that the state's actions were
not primarily designed to protect a pecuniary interest.63 The court specifically refused to
adopt the debtor's premise that "preservation of the debtor's estate is of greater priority in
the statutory scheme set forth by Congress in Title XI than is the enforcement of environ-
mental protection laws explicitly intended to be excepted from the automatic stay."'64 Two
tests were cited by the court for determining whether an action by a governmental unit falls
within the automatic stay or is excepted under the "police power" exception 65 -the pecu-
niary purpose test and the public policy test. The court stated:
Under the pecuniary purpose test, reviewing courts focus on whether the governmental
proceeding relates primarily to the protection of the government's pecuniary interest in the
debtors [sic] property, and not to matters of public safety. Those proceedings which relate
primarily to matters of public safety are excepted from the stay. Under the public policy test,
reviewing courts must distinguish between proceedings that adjudicate private rights and
those that effectuate public policy. Those proceedings that effectuate a public policy are ex-
cepted from the stay. 66
In the recent case of United States v. Nicolet, Inc. ,67 the United States sought to recover
response costs for a cleanup of a debtor's hazardous waste site .68 During the trial, the
debtor filed for relief under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code and sought to apply the
56. Id. at 1179.
57. 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) (1988) is a catch-alI provision which provides the bankruptcy courts general equity powers by stating
that the court may issue any order, process, or judgment that is necessary to carry out the provisions of the Bankruptcy Code.
58. S. RP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 52 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 5787, 5838;
H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 340. 343 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S. CoD CoNG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5963, 6298.
59. 818 F.2d 1077 (3d Cir. 1987).
60. Id. at 1089.
61. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 69-3-101 to -129 (1984).
62. 847 F.2d 291 (6th Cir. 1988).
63. Id. at 296.
64. Id. at 297.
65. Id. at 295 (citing NLRB v. Edward Cooper Painting, Inc., 804 F.2d 934, 942 (6th Cir. 1986)).
66. Id. at 295 (citing NLRB v. Edward Cooper Painting, Inc., 804 F.2d 934, 942 (6th Cir. 1986)).
67. 857 F.2d 202 (3d Cir. 1988).
68. Id.
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automatic stay to the government's action to recover cleanup costs. 69  In holding for the
government, the court concluded that simply permitting the government's claim to be re-
duced to a judgment does not require the seizure of the debtor's property: "Moreover, that
Congress carefully made only enforcement of a money judgment subject to the automatic
stay indicates strongly that mere entry of the judgment was not intended to be pro-
scribed.'o
Separate and apart from the automatic stay provisions of the Bankruptcy Code, a debtor
may also attempt to seek protection by obtaining an injunction from the bankruptcy court
by appealing to its general equitable powers.71
B. Priority Status of Environmental Claims
A party that has expended money to clean up hazardous material on property owned by
a debtor may become a creditor of the bankruptcy estate, but the claim is worth very little if
the party is left as an unsecured creditor. To avoid this unenviable result, the EPA and state
environmental units often seek to characterize the response expense as "the actual, neces-
sary costs and expenses of preserving the estate" for administrative expense priority under
the Bankruptcy Code.72 With the exception of secured creditors, administrative expense
73priority creditors will be satisfied first from estate assets.
Administrative expense priority is granted sparingly by the bankruptcy courts. Claims
for the priority have been denied where the claimant was a third party relying on the pri-
vate right of action for cleanup of property that was not in the bankruptcy estate. 74 Any
claim for administrative expenses and costs must be the actual and necessary costs of pre-
serving the estate for the benefit of its creditors. 75 The terms "actual" and "necessary" are
construed narrowly so as "to keep fees and administrative costs at a minimum." 76 Also, an
actual benefit must accrue to the estate.77 Although a claim may meet the implicit require-
ments of the Bankruptcy Code, bankruptcy courts have broad discretion in determining
whether to award administrative expense priority and will sometimes deny the priority in
order to keep costs of administering the estate at a minimum.7 8 However, when the
cleanup costs result from monies expended for the preservation of the bankruptcy estate,
69. Id.
70. Id. at 209.
71. 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) (1988); see also, In re M. Frenville Co., 744 F.2d 332 (3d Cir. 1984) (the automatic stay did not apply
where acts of the debtor which gave rise to suit occurred before the filing of the bankruptcy petition but the cause of action stem-
ming from those acts did not arise until after the petition had been filed -only proceedings which could have been commenced or
claims which arise befre the filing of bankruptcy are automatically stayed), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1160 (1985).
72. 11 U.sC. § 503(b)(1)(A) (1988).
73. 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(1) (1988).
74. Burlington N.R.R. Co. v. Dant & Russell, Inc., 853 F.2d 700 (9th Cir. 1988); Southern Ry. Co. v. Johnson Bronze Co.,
758 F.2d 137 (3d Cir. 1985) (Administrative priority was denied because the cleanups by the parties were not undertaken to
preserve the bankruptcy estate).
75. In re Baldwin-United Corp., 43 Bankr. 443, 451 (S.D. Ohio 1984).
76. In re O.P.M. Leasing Servs., Inc., 23 Bankr. 104, 121 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1982).
77. In re McKeesport Steel Castings Co., 799 F.2d 91,94-95 (3d Cir. 1986).
78.43 Bankr. at 452. In Baldwin-United the court stated:
It is the central purpose of rejuvenating financially desperate businesses which gives meaning to the administrative pri-
ority provisions of the Code: Congress recognized that, ifa business is to be reorganized, third parties must be willing to
provide the necessary goods and services. Since they clearly will not do so unless their claims for payment will be paid
ahead of the prepetition debts and liabilities of the debtor, § [503(b)(l)(A)] provides a priority for expenses incurred by
the debtor-in-possession in order to maintain, preserve, or rehabilitate the bankrupt estate.
Id. (quoting In re Mammoth Mart, Inc., 536 F.2d 950, 954 (1st Cir. 1976)).
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the courts have rightly held that the claimant was entitled to administrative expense prior-
ity.79 In contrast, damages incurred pre-petition are not entitled to administrative expense
priority. 80
In In re Stevens, 81 cleanup costs absorbed by the state after the filing of a bankruptcy
petition were held by the district court to be a first priority administrative expense rather
than an unsecured claim.82 The issue arose after the Maine Department of Environmental
Protection hired a contractor to remove twenty-nine drums of waste oil. 83 According to the
state, the oil had been inadequately stored by the debtor. The contractor was hired after
the debtor filed its petition. Given that fact, the state contended its cleanup costs were first
priority administrative costs.84  The bankruptcy court rejected the Department's claim
85
and held that the state had a pre-petition claim affording it no greater rights than any other
general, unsecured creditor.88 On appeal, the state contended that the Supreme Court's
decision in Midlantic National Bank v. New Jersey Department of Environmental Protec-
tion,87 required reversal of the bankruptcy court's holding. 88
The district court responded by noting that the drums of waste oil were on the debtor's
property and as such, became property of the debtor's estate once the petition was filed.8 9
In turn, this meant that the responsibility for the oil was shifted to the trustee since, under
Midlantic, the trustee cannot abandon property when to do so would contravene state laws
or regulations designed to protect the public health or safety. Accordingly, the district
court concluded that Midlantic and the instant case were indistinguishable because both
cases involved abandonment of PCB-contaminated oil that threatened the public health
79. Lancaster v. Tennessee, 831 F.2d 118, 124 (6th Cir. 1987) (state entitled to administrative expense priority for its re-
sponse costs from the debtor's estate under CERCLA); In re Stevens, 68 Bankr. 774, 783 (D. Me. 1987) (state entitled to admin-
istrative expense priority for costs it incurred in removing waste from property of the estate); In re Distrigas Corp., 66 Bankr.
382, 386 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1986) (to the extent that the state expended funds to clean up debtor's contaminated property (whose
property absent cleanup had little or no value), it would be entitled to a first priority administrative expense claim); In re T.P.
Long Chem., Inc., 45 Bankr. 278 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1985) (Here the United States Environmental Protection Agency, which
incurred costs by fulfilling its statutory duty to remove hazardous waste from property of the bankruptcy estate after the bank-
ruptcy trustee declined to fulfill his obligation to do so, could not recover any portion of its expenditure as an administrative
expense from any funds in which a secured creditor has a security interest). See also Lancaster v. State (In re Wall Tube & Metal
Prods. Co.), 831 F.2d 118 (6th Cir. 1987). But see In re Mowbray Eng'g Co., 67 Bankr. 34, 35 (Bankr. M.D. Ala. 1986) ("Al-
though II U.S.C. § 554 permits a trustee to abandon property, the authority to abandon must yield to govemmental interests in
public health and safety, which includes using assets of the estate for the necessary cleanup." However, where the estate has only
nominal assets, far insufficient to accomplish the necessary cleanup and any sale of the property must depend upon the efforts of
the EPA or other governmental unit to clean up the site, the response costs may be recovered upon the sale of the property prior to
satisfying any secured claims against the property.)
80. 853 F.2d at 709.
81. d. at 783-84.
82.68 Bankr. 774 (D. Me. 1987), revg 53 Bankr. 783 (Bankr. Me. 1985).
83. Id. at 776.
84. Id.
85. In re Stevens, 53 Bankr. 783 (Bankr. Me. 1985), revd, 68 Bankr. 774 (D. Me. 1987).
86. Id. at 789.
87. 474 U.S. 494 (1986), affig, In re Quanta Resources Corp., 739 F.2d 912 (3d Cir. 1984).
88. 68 Bankr. at 777.
89. Id. at 780.
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and safety.9" The district court ruled that the rationale and holding of Midlantic could not
be avoided by the trustee. 91
In contrast to the result in In re Stevens, an administrative expense priority claim for
cleanup costs was denied in In re Dant & Russell, Inc. 92 In that case the claimant sought
administrative priority for costs incurred for cleaning up hazardous waste on land leased
by the debtor post-petition. Costs were incurred by the claimant pursuant to an agreement
with the EPA. 93 In denying the administrative expense priority claim, the court inter-
preted section 503(b)(1)(A) of the Bankruptcy Code narrowly in order to keep fees and
administrative costs at a minimum 94 and held that under section 503(b)(1)(A), there must
be an actual benefit to the estate of such costs .9 The court balanced the need to maintain
the estate in as healthy a form as possible for the benefit of creditors with the necessity of
allowing essential costs of administering an ongoing business to be paid up front. The
court then found that the costs involved did not amount to preservation of the estate but




The Bankruptcy Code allows a trustee to abandon estate property that is "burdensome
to the estate or. .. of inconsequential value and benefit to the estate. 97 Certain parties in
interest, such as a creditor with a lien on the property, also may apply for an order directing
the trustee to abandon estate property.98 In determining the propriety of abandonment, the
court will apply the "business judgment" standard 99 and deny the request where the prop-
erty can be used by the estate for good purpose.1 0 If abandonment is allowed, the estate
relinquishes its interest in the property. Whether the Bankruptcy Code permits abandon-
ment of property and associated liabilities as a means of avoiding obligations under the en-
vironmental laws is an issue which has invited differing opinions from the nation's
judiciary.
90. Id.
91. The court stated:
The Midlantic rationale for curbing the power of the bankruptcy court to authorize abandonment of hazardous wastes is
that the public health and safety take precedence over the longstanding, but more parochial, concerns of efficient bank-
ruptcy administration. [T]he Bankruptcy Court may only authorize an abandonment of hazardous wastes upon condi-
tions which will provide adequate protection of the public health and safety. Often the very purpose ...of an
abandonment is to work a release of the trustee and the estate from the custodial and attendant regulatory responsibilities
imposed by law upon the possessor of property of the estate. . . . Midlantic leaves no room for the estate to avoid the
administrative expense attendant upon its possession of hazardous waste, except upon the acquiescence of the public
authorities whose ultimate legal obligation it is to protect the public health and safety from hazardous waste abandoned
by those responsible for its existence. . . .Unless Midlantic is to be disregarded, the trustee may not be permitted sim-
ply to walk away from hazardous wastes in circumstances where the bankruptcy court itself would be powerless to autho-
rize their abandonment.
Id. at 781-82.
92. 853 F.2d 700 (9th Cir. 1988).
93. Id. at 702.
94. Id. at 709.
95. Id. at 707.
96. Id. at 709.
97. 11 U.S.C. § 554(a) (1988).
98. 11 U.S.C. § 554(b) (1988).
99. In re Beker Indus. Corp., 64 Bankr. 900 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1986), rev d, 89 Bankr. 336 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
100. In re K.C. Mach. & Tool Co., 816 F.2d 238 (6th Cir. 1987).
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In Midlantic National Bank v. New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection,10 1
the United States Supreme Court upheld the decision of the Third Circuit Court of Appeals
that the "trustee may not abandon property in contravention of a state statute or regulation
that is reasonably designed to protect the public health or safety from identified haz-
ards."' During negotiations with the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protec-
tion for the cleanup of a hazardous waste site, Quanta Resources Corporation filed a
petition for reorganization under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code. 10 3 After the state
agency issued an order requiring cleanup, the debtor converted the case to a liquidation
under Chapter 7. Contending that abandonment would threaten the public's health and
safety and would violate state and federal environmental law, the City and State of New
York objected to the trustee's proposed abandonment of the site.l°4
In reaching its decision, the Supreme Court found that Congress did not intend for the
trustee's abandonment power to preempt all state and local laws and that a bankruptcy
court "does not have the power to authorize an abandonment without formulating condi-
tions that will adequately protect the public's health and safety." '
The Court relied principally on three pre-Code cases which placed on the trustee limita-
tions necessary to protect governmental interests. 106 In Otenheimer v. Whitaker'0 7 a bank-
ruptcy trustee was prohibited from abandoning several barges that would have obstructed a
navigable passage in violation of federal law. 10 8 Similarly, in In re Chicago Rapid Transit
Co.,19 the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that the trustee of a debtor transit com-
pany could not discontinue its operation of a branch railroad line when local law required
continued operation." 0 In the third case, In re Louis Jones, Inc., "' the debtor public utili-
ties were required to seal underground steamlines before abandoning them in order to pro-
tect public interest.
In holding that the Bankruptcy Code does not allow abandonment of property in contra-
vention of a state statute or regulation reasonably designed to protect the public's health or
safety from identified hazards, the court provided little guidance on the types of "contra-
ventions" of state and local environmental laws that fall within the exception to the trustee's
abandonment power. 112 The court couched its holding in terms of the bankruptcy court's
obligation to impose "conditions"' 1 3 protective of public health and safety but expressly left
101. 474 U.S. 494 (1986), aoffg In re Quanta Resources Corp., 739 F.2d 912 (3d Cir. 1984); accord In re Catamount Dyers,
Inc., 13 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 321 (Bankr. D. Vt. 1984).
102. 474 U.S. at 507.
103. Id. at 497.
104. Id. at 498.
105. Id. at 506-07.
106. Id. at 500.
107. 198 F.2d 289 (4th Cir. 1952).
108. The court stated:
Thejudge-made [abandonment] rule must give way when it comes into conflict with a statute enacted in order to ensure
the safety of navigation; for we are not dealing with a burden imposed upon the bankrupt or his property by contract, but
a duty and a burden imposed upon an owner of vessels by an Act of Congress in the public interest.
id. at 290.
109. 129 F.2d I (7th Cir), cert. denied sub nom. Chicago Junction R.R. Co. v. Sprague, 317 U.S. 683 (1942).
110. 129 F2d at 6.
111. 1 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 277 (Bankr. ED. Pa. 1974).
112. Consider, for example, situations in which the violation occurs pre-petition, or in which the environmental hazard results
from pre-petition activities which at the time were not unlawful.
113. 474 U.S. at 494.
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open whether certain state laws may be "so onerous" ' 14 as to impermissibly interfere with
the bankruptcy adjudication itself." 5
A series of cases subsequent to Midlantic distinguished the opinion and allowed aban-
donment. The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, for instance, in In re Smith-Douglass,
Inc. ,118 considered the conditions under which a trustee in bankruptcy may abandon prop-
erty in violation of state environmental law. In noting Midlantic's narrow exception to a
trustee's abandonment powers under section 554(a) of the Bankruptcy Code,"1 7 the Fourth
Circuit confirmed the trial court's' 1 8 finding that unconditional abandonment was appro-
priate in light of the estate's lack of unencumbered assets and the absence of serious public
health and safety risks. 1" 9 The court in In re FCX, Inc.' 2' held that a Chapter 11 debtor
seeking to abandon property posing an imminent threat to public safety could abandon the
property on the condition that the debtor set aside a sufficient sum for payment of cleanup
costs incurred by the EPA or the State of North Carolina. The court made it clear that for
purposes of abandonment, the court, not the EPA or the state, is the one that determines
whether there is an immediate threat to the public health and safety.'
21
The trustee was allowed to abandon certain real estate surrounding the estate's oil refin-
ery in In re Oklahoma Refining Co. 122 In comparing the facts of the case before it with
those in the Midlantic decision, the bankruptcy court in Oklahoma Refining determined
that pollution at the refinery did not present immediate and menacing harm to public
health and safety. The court further determined that the pollution would not aggravate the
existing situation, create a genuine emergency, or increase the possibility of disaster or in-
tensification of the pollution. 123  Requiring strict compliance with state environmental
laws would, the court reasoned, "create a bankruptcy case in perpetuity and fetter the es-
tate to a situation without resolve." 24
114. Id.
115. The court stated:
This exception to the abandonment power vested in the trustee by § 554 is a narrow one. It does not encompass a specu-
lative or indeterminate future violation of such laws that may stem from abandonment. The abandonment power is not to
be fettered by laws or regulations not reasonably calculated to protect the public health or safety from imminent and
identifiable harm.
Id. at 507 n.9.
116. 856 F.2d 12 (4th Cir. 1988), affg In re Smith-Douglass, Inc., 75 Bankr. 994 (E.D.N.C. 1987).
117. 856 F.2d at 15.
118. In re Smith-Douglass, Inc., 75 Bankr. 994 (E.D.N.C. 1987), affd, 856 F.2d 12 (4th Cir. 1988).
119. 856 F2d at 17. See also In re A & T Trailer Park, Inc., 53 Bankr. 144 (Bankr. D. Wyo. 1985), where, even though a
mobile home park did not comply with Wyoming environmental quality laws, the court held that the trustee was not precluded
from abandoning the park, since the debtor's estate had no assets with which to pay for the maintenance and preservation of the
property. Similarly, in In re Better-Brite Plating, Inc., 105 Bankr. 912 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 1989), the court allowed abandonment
of real estate containing hazardous waste where the trustee had no unencumbered assets with which to finance cleanup costs of
the property and there was no imminent harm or danger to the public. In In re Microfab, Inc., 105 Bankr. 161 (Bankr. D. Mass.
1989), a liquidating trustee was not required to clean up a Chapter 7 debtor's industrial site although environmental contamina-
tion of the site posed a significant danger to public health and safety. InMicrofab, the Commonwealth of Massachusetts failed to
show that the trustee could appreciably reduce the threat of harm even by expending all funds of the estate. Id. at 166.
120. 96 Bankr. 49 (Bankr. E.D.N.C.), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1118 (1989).
121. 96 Bankr. at54.
122. 63 Bankr. 562 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1986).




A less restrictive view of Midlantic was taken in In re Franklin Signal Corp. 12 in which
the court held that the trustee need only take adequate precautionary measures to ensure
that there is no imminent danger to the public as a result of the abandonment. 12 6 Holding
that a trustee in a Chapter 7 could abandon hazardous waste when the estate was without
necessary funds to comply with state environmental laws, 127 the court listed five factors
that should be considered in determining whether an application for abandonment of haz-
ardous waste should be approved:
(1) the imminence of danger to the public health and safety,
(2) the extent of probable harm,
(3) the amount and type of hazardous waste,
(4) the cost to bring the property into compliance with environmental laws, and
(5) the amount and type of funds available for cleanup. 
128
In contrast to the Franklin Signal decision, the court in In re Stevens129 took an expansive
view of the Midlantic decision and held that the trustee could not abandon hazardous
waste. 130 The court reasoned that "[tihe Midlantic rationale for curbing the power of the
bankruptcy court to authorize abandonment of hazardous wastes is that the public health
and safety take precedence over the long standing, but more parochial, concerns of effi-
cient bankruptcy administration. " 131
125. 65 Bankr. 268 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1986).
126. Id. at 273. See also In re Corona Plastics, Inc., 99 Bankr. 231 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1989).
127. The court stated:
In some cases, a strict application of the Midlantic holding is not practical, or even possible. For example, in a Chapter 7
no-asset case the trustee is rendered helpless. On the one hand, the trustee has no funds -secured or unsecured - to pay
for the hazardous waste cleanup. On the other hand, the court cannot authorize an abandonment under § 554(a) if it
would contravene state environmental laws. The ironic quirk in a strict application of Midlantic is that the property
would ultimately be abandoned by default pursuant to II U.S.C. § 554(c). That section provides: "any property sched-
uled under section 521 (a)(1) of this title not otherwise administered at the time of the closing of a case is abandoned to
the debtor and administered for purposes of section 350 of this title." id. Because a strict application of Midlantic would
simply side-step the problem, it is entirely logical to conclude that the majority did not intend such a result. See a/so In re
Oklahoma Ref. Co., 63 Bankr. 562 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1986) for another dilemma that would result from a strict read-
ing of Midlantic.
65 Bankr. at 272 n.5.
128.65 Bankr. at 272.
129.68 Bankr. 774 (D. Me. 1987).
130. Id. at 780.
131.68 Bankr. at 781. See also In re Peerless Plating Co., 70 Bankr. 943 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1987). The trustee could not
abandon the site of the debtor's former plant in violation of CERCLA. 70Bankr. at946-47. The court held that despite one of the
trustee's witnesses dipping his hands in the hazardous solution to prove they were too diluted to be harmful "there was a [sic]
immediate harm of the sort Congress meant to prevent by enacting CERCLA." 70 Bankr. at 947. The court disagreed with the
holding in Franklin Signal Corp.. stating that the clear impact ofMidlantic language is that a trustee may not abandon a hazardous
waste site unless:
1. [tihe environmental law in question is so onerous as to interfere with the bankruptcy adjudication itself; or
2. [t]he environmental law in question is not reasonably designed to protect the public health or safety from identified
hazards; or
3. [t]he violation caused by abandonment would merely be speculative or indeterminate.
70 Bankr. at 947.
1989]
MISSISSIPPI COLLEGE LA WREVIEW
With the bankruptcy courts in such disarray over the interpretation of Midlantic, the only
certainty is that there are no precise rules that can be laid down concerning the trustee's
ability to abandon hazardous waste. 
132
D. Dischargeability of Environmental Liabilities
Obligations to pay money arising pre-petition are dischargeable in bankruptcy.1 33 How-
ever, it is unsettled whether pre-petition injunctions requiring costs to be incurred in the
future for cleanup of waste discovered pre-petition are dischargeable debts.
The discharge is possibly the greatest benefit afforded a debtor in bankruptcy. Only an
individual debtor is entitled to a Chapter 7 discharge. 34 With few exclusions 35 a discharge
essentially acts as an accord and satisfaction not only of the debtor's pre-petition debts
136
but ofjudgments entered against the debtor as well. 137 A debtor may be denied a complete
discharge under certain circumstances. 3 8 However, there is an important distinction be-
tween an exception to discharge of a particular debt139 and the denial or revocation of a
discharge of all debts.1 4' The Bankruptcy Code lists five general categories of events
which give rise to a denial of discharge in a Chapter 7 case.141
Ohio v. Kovacs1 42 is the leading case concerning the issue of whether pre-petition in-
junctions requiring costs incurred in the future for cleaning up waste discovered pre-peti-
132. See, e.g., In re Brio Ref., Inc., 86 Bankr. 487 (N.D. Tex. 1988). In allowing abandonment, the court reasoned that if
property is abandoned prior to being identified as a risk of harm to the public, the abandonment should be finalized: "[Tlhis case
is factually distinguishable from Midlantic. The court therefore concludes that the bankruptcy court had jurisdiction to authorize
abandonment." 86 Bankr. at 489. See also In re FCX, Inc., 96 Bankr. 49 (Bankr. E.D.N.C.), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1118
(1989); In re 82 Milbar Blvd., Inc., 91 Bankr. 213 (Bankr. E. D.N.Y. 1988); In re Purco, 76 Bankr. 523 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1987).
In State of Wisconsin v. Better-Brite Plating, Inc. (Cir. Ct., Brown County Wis. 1990), as yet unreported, and now on appeal to
the Wisconsin Court of Appeals (Case No. 90-0280), the trial court imposed personal liability on a bankruptcy trustee for negli-
gently failing to obtain a required permit before storing barrels containing hazardous waste, ordered removal of the barrels at an
approximate cost of $75,000, and imposed fines against the trustee of up to $25,000 per day.
On appeal, the Bankruptcy, Creditors' Rights, and Insolvency Section of the State Bar of Wisconsin has filed an amicus curiae
brief in support of the trustee.
133. 11 U.S.C.§§727(b), 1141(d)(l)(A)(1988).
134. 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(1) (1988). See Yamaha Motor Corp. v. Shadco, Inc., 762 F.2d 668 (8th Cir. 1985).
135. 11 U.S.C. § 727(a) (1988).
136. 11 U.S.C. § 727(b) (1988).
137. 11 U.S.C. § 524(a)(1) (1988).
138. 11 U.S.C. § 727(a) (1988).
139. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a) (1988).
140. 11 U.S.C. § 727(a) (1988).
141. These five general categories are as follows:
(1) Lack of capacity under II U.S.C. § 727(a)(1) (1988)-if the debtor is not an individual, no discharge is granted.
(2) Debtor misconduct under II U.S.C. § 727(a)(2)-(4) (1988)-actions by debtor with the intent to hinder, delay, or defraud
creditors; falsification or destruction of books and records; lying to the court; or failure to cooperate with a court officer will all
be grounds fordenial of discharge. See, e.g., In re Smiley, 864 F.2d 562 (7th Cir. 1989); Norwest Bank Neb., N.A. v. Tveten,
848 F.2d 871 (8th Cir. 1988); In re Reed, 700 F2d 986 (5th Cir. 1983). Contra Hanson v. First Nat'l Bank in Brookings, 848
F2d 866 (8th Cir. 1988); In re Bloom, 41 Bankr. 816 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1984).
(3) Debtor"amnesia" under II U.S.C. § 727(a)(5) (1988) -failure of the debtor to satisfactorily explain any loss of assets prior
to the bankruptcy or to maintain books and records may provide grounds for denial of discharge. See In re Martin, 698 F.2d 883
(7th Cir. 1983); In re Rowe, 81 Bankr. 653 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1987).
(4) Debtor recalcitrance under 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(6) (1988) -refusal of the debtor to obey court orders, to testify under oath
when required, or to testify on the grounds of the fifth amendment after being granted immunity are all grounds far denial of
discharge.
(5) Prior discharge under II U.S.C. § 727(a)(8)-(9) (1988)-a debtor is only entitled to a discharge in bankruptcy every six
years. As such, a discharge under either the Code or the Bankruptcy Act granted within six years of the date of the petition under
which a discharge is sought will be grounds for denial of discharge.
142. 469 U.S. 274 (1985).
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tion are dischargeable debts. In Kovacs, the State of Ohio obtained an injunction in state
court ordering the debtor and other defendants to clean up a hazardous waste site. When
the defendants failed to comply, the state obtained the appointment of a state court receiver
who was directed to take possession of the defendant's property and to implement the in-
junction. 1" Subsequently, the debtor filed a bankruptcy petition. The state then filed a
complaint in the bankruptcy court seeking a declaration that the debtor's obligation under
the state injunction was not dischargeable in bankruptcy because the obligation was neither
a "debt"1  nor a "liability on a claim
14 within the meaning of the Bankruptcy Code.
1 46
Because the debtor's default was a breach of a statute and not the breach of an ordinary
commercial contract, argued the state, the injunction was not a claim against the debtor for
bankruptcy purposes, and the debtor's breach of his obligation under the injunction did not
give rise to a right to payment within the meaning of section 101(4)(B) of the Bankruptcy
Code. 
147
Rejecting both arguments tendered by the state, the Supreme Court upheld the opinion
of the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals that, in effect, the only type of performance the state
was interested in was a money payment to effectuate the cleanup operations.,8 Under the
circumstances, reasoned the Court, the cleanup duty had been reduced to a monetary obli-
gation. 149
Except for debts saved from discharge under section 523,150 a discharge in bankruptcy
discharges the debtor from all debts that arose before the bankruptcy petition was filed. 51
For purposes of bankruptcy, a debt is a "liability on a claim."" 2 Whether the discharge
provisions of the Bankruptcy Code apply to mandatory injunctive relief that cannot be per-
formed personally and would require a debtor in a Chapter 7 liquidation bankruptcy to
spend money was the issue addressed in United States v. Whizco, Inc.1 5 3 In Whizco, the
debtor coal mining company and its sole shareholder were ordered to reclaim a coal mine
that had been abandoned in violation of the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act
143. Id. at 276.
144. II U.S.C. § 101(l1) (1988).
145. Id.
146. 469 U.S. at 277.
147. Id. at 279.
148. Id. at 285.
149. The court cited the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals' decision as follows:
The impact of its attempt to realize upon Kovacs' income or property cannot be concealed by legerdemain or linguistic
gymnastics. Kovacs cannot personally clean up the waste he wrongfully released into Ohio waters. He cannot perform
the affirmative obligations properly imposed upon him by the State court except by paying money or transferring over
his own financial resources. The State of Ohio has acknowledged this by its steadfast pursuit of payment as an alterna-
tive to personal performance.
Id. at 137 (quoting In re Kovacs, 717 F2d 984, 987-88 (6th Cir. 1983)).
150. 11 U.S.C. §523(a) (1988).
151.11 U.S.C. § 727(b) (1988).
152. 11 U.S.C. § 101(11) (1988). The Code broadly defines a "claim" as follows:
(A) [a] right to payment, whether or not such right is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent,
matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or unsecured; or
(B) [a] right to an equitable remedy for breach of performance if such breach gives rise to a right to payment, whether or
not such right to an equitable remedy is reduced to judgment, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undis-
puted, secured, or unsecured ....
II U.S.C. § 101(4)(1988).
153. 841 F2d 147 (6th Cir. 1988).
MISSISSIPPI COLLEGE LA WREVIEW
of 1977. sa In its suit against the debtors, the Office of Surface Mining, Reclamation and
Enforcement (OSM)15 5 sought a permanent injunction against the debtors for mining coal
anywhere in the United States until the debtors remedied the violations.1 56 The OSM also
sought "affirmative remedial action on the part of defendants to perform specific acts of
reclamation which would abate the environmental damage at the defendants' surface min-
ing site in Tennessee.,"157 Looking to the substance of the OSM's complaint rather than the
form of the relief sought, the Sixth Circuit held that the plaintiff was really seeking pay-
ment, and, that to the extent fulfilling the debtor's obligation to reclaim the site would force
him to spend money, the obligation was a "liability on a claim." 1 8 However, the court cau-
tioned that its holding was very narrow,15 9 and to the extent the debtor could comply with
the OSM's orders without spending money, "his bankruptcy did not discharge his obliga-
tion to comply with the orders.' 6 o
On facts similar to those of the Whizco decision, the bankruptcy court in In re Robin-
son 16 ' held that a judgment against a Chapter 7 debtor requiring him to restore marshland
was discharged in bankruptcy. 162 The court reasoned that even though the duty to restore
the marshland was facially non-monetary, the debtor would be required to spend money in




With the increase in bankruptcy filings throughout the country, bankruptcy and envi-
ronmental attorneys are being called upon to assist lenders, debtors, and others with a wide
range of legal issues relative to liens on contaminated assets, actions for stay relief and
abandonment of property, dischargeability of environmental claims, and the effects of en-
vironmental enforcement actions in bankruptcy proceedings.
To achieve environmentally responsible solutions in this emerging area of practice,
members of the bar must have a clear understanding of the long-term effects of hazardous
waste pollution, recent developments in case law, and a heightened appreciation of the
principles of bankruptcy and environmental law.
154.30 U.S.C. § 1201 (1988).
155. The Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977 created the Office of Surface Mining, Reclamation and En-
forcement within the Department of the Interior.
156. 841 F2dat 148.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 150.
159. Id. at 151.
160. Id.
161.46 Bankr. 136 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1985), rev'don other grounds, 55 Bankr. 355 (M.D. Fla. 1985).
162.46 Bankr. at 137.
163. Id. at 138.
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